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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent decision of Tcherepnin v. Knight,' a case of first impres-
sion, held that a share account, or a withdrawable capital account in an
Illinois chartered savings and loan association was not a "security" within
the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2
This decision arose out of an action brought by the plaintiffs against
City Savings Association, an Illinois chartered savings and loan associa-
tion which was undergoing voluntary liquidation and was in the custody
of the defendant, Director of Financial Institutions of the State of Illinois.
In their complaint, plaintiffs described themselves as purchasers of
securities issued by City Savings, consisting of capital shares and a capi-
tal interest in City Savings. The plaintiffs further alleged that in acquiring
the above-described interests they had relied on false and misleading solic-
itations mailed to them in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934' and of the general rules and regulations promul-
gated thereunder.4
* Member Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review
1. 371 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 87 S. Ct. 2076 (1967).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1964) [hereinafter referred to as the 1934 act].
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964). This section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contradiction of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
4. Section 10b although broad in its terms is not self-executing, pursuant to the con-
394
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Jurisdiction was invoked under section 27 of the 1934 act5 and the
plaintiffs sought to have their purchases declared void pursuant to section
29(b)' of the Act entitling them to rescind their investments and recover
the amount of their investments plus interest.7
The defendant, City Savings, and the three liquidators moved to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the share
accounts involved were not securities within the meaning of the 1934 act.
This motion was denied by the district court.
The question presented by denial of this motion to dismiss was cer-
tified by the district court.' Petition for leave to file interlocutory appeal
was granted.
The court of appeals concluded that the interests involved were not
within the definition of a "security" under the 1934 act, and that there-
fore the anti-fraud provisions of that act were not applicable and the
district court lacked jurisdiction. The decision of the district court was
reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to dismiss the com-
plaint.
The significance and effect of this decision cannot be overemphasized.
At the conclusion of the majority opinion the sighs of relief by the al-
ready heavily regulated savings and loan industry were almost audible.9
gressional delegation of authority contained in section 10b, on May 21, 1942, the SEC
adopted rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5 (1949), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of any facility or any national secur-
ities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1964).
7. The general rule at common law is that one who has been induced to subscribe to
shares in a savings and loan association by fraudulent representations as to its financial
condition cannot, after the association becomes insolvent and is in the hands of receivers,
rescind his contract and recover the amount which he had deposited or invested. Rummens
v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n 182 Wash. 539, 47 P.2d 845, 100 A.L.R. 570 (1935); See Dunn
v. Candee, 98 App. Div. 317, 90 N.Y.S. 674 (1904).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964).
9. The scope and sheer volume of rules and regulations to which the savings and loan
associations are subject prompted this comment from a former member of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board:
Without question, the savings and loan business is the most regulated of any indus-
try, financial or otherwise in the United States today. In the future, restraint should
be used by the industry and by Government in the shape and amount of regulation
imposed on savings institutions . . . . Regulations and government control, when
unduly accentuated tend to generate weakness rather than strength in management.
They tend to distort normal business judgment in compliance with technical require-
ments rather than to business dictates ....
Prather & Weeks, Savings and Loan Legislation-1965, 21 Bus. LAW. 739 (1966).
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On the other hand, the decision denies to share account holders the relief
afforded by the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934.10
II. THE NATURE OF A SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION "SHARE
AcCOUNT"
Generally, when money is deposited in a commercial bank, title passes
to the bank. The bank becomes the debtor of the depositor to the extent
of the deposit, and to that extent the depositor becomes the creditor of
the bank." Similarly, the relationship of debtor and creditor exists be-
tween a mutual savings bank and a depositor. 12
The holder of a share account in a savings and loan association is
not a creditor of the association, but a shareholder. 3 The relationship of a
shareholder to a savings and loan association is analogous to the rela-
tionship between a shareholder and a corporation. Income paid on share
accounts is not interest but dividends.'" Share account holders elect the
directors of the association,' 5 they have the right to inspect certain
records' 6 and they have a right to receive dividends.' Holders of share
accounts are subject to pro-rata liability for losses of the association,"
and share proportionately in the association's property upon the winding
up of the association.' 9 Like a shareholder in a corporation, holders of
share accounts occupy a subordinate position to the claims of general
creditors.2 °
III. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
Both the Securities Act of 193321 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 193422 contain provisions which define the term "security" in detail.
10. Since the Illinois statutory provisions regarding share accounts are typical and do
not deviate materially from similar legislation in other states and on the federal level, the
decision in Tcherepnin v. Knight would be equally applicable to share accounts in all "non-
stock" savings and loan associations.
11. W. HAWKLAND, COMMERCIAL PAPER AND BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS 276 (1967).
12. GARCIA, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 665 (6th ed. 1961).
13. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Porter 296 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds,
370 U.S. 159 (1961) ; Wisconsin Bankers' Ass'n v. Robertson, 294 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 938 (1961) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32 § 773(F) 1965 (the Illinois Savings
& Loan Act) provides: "The holder of withdrawable capital for which application for with-
drawal has been made, does not become a creditor by reason of such application." But see
Protective Comm. v. Stewart, 241 Md. 89, 215 A.2d 726 (1966) ; Family Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Stewart, 232 Md. 424, 194 A.2d 118 (1963).
14. GARCIA, supra note 12, at 66. See also FLA. STAT. § 665.29 (1965).
15. FLA. STAT. § 665.11 (1965); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32 § 742 (1965) GARCIA, supra
note 12.
16. FLA. STAT. § 665.30 (1965); ILL REV STAT. ch. 32 § 748 (1965).
17. FLA. STAT. § 665.29 (1966) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32 § 780 (1965).
18. FLA. STAT. § 665.32 (1965).
19. FLA. STAT. § 665.19 (1965) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32 § 908 (1965).
20. FLA. STAT. § 665.19 (1965).
21. 15 U.S.C. 77a (1964) [hereinafter referred to as the 1933 act].
22. See note 2 supra.
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Any question concerning the applicability of these two acts must begin
with these provisions. Since the acts are in pari materia23 an analysis of
the definition sections of both acts is appropriate.
The 1934 Act defines securities as:
[a]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in
any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-
trust certificate, pre-organization certificate, or subscription,
transferable share, investment, contract, voting trust certificate,
certificate of deposit, for a security or in general, any instru-
ment commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of in-
terest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for,
receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any
of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note,
draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a ma-
turity at time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive
of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which
is likewise limited.24
The definition of a "security" contained in the 1933 act25 is with one
minor exception identical to that given in the 1934 act.2 6 The one differ-
ence is that the 1933 act contains the term "evidence of indebtedness '27
while the 1934 Act does not. Both acts clearly manifest an intent on the
part of Congress to give the term "security" a broad and liberal mean-
ing, as opposed to a strict and technical definition.28
Admittedly, neither the 1933 nor the 1934 Act specifically includes
within its definition of a security share accounts in savings and loan
associations. However, the 1933 Act specifically exempts such interests
from the registration provisions of the Act. 29 It further provides that this
exemption is not applicable to the anti-fraud provisions of the Act."°
23. Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1964).
25. 15 U.S:C. § 77b (1) (1964).
26. The Senate report on the 1934 act observed that its definition of a security was
substantially the same as that in the 1933 act. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964).
28. "The term 'security' is defined in sufficiently broad and liberal terms so as to in-
clude within that definition the many types of instruments that in our commercial world
fall within the ordinary concept of security." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1933). "The Securities Act of 1933 describes 'security' very much more broadly than had
been the previous interpretation of that term." SEC v. Starmont, 31 F. Supp. 264, 266 (E.D.
Wash. 1940).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1964) provides in pertinent part:
Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this subchapter shall not
apply to any of the following classes of securities:
(5) Any security issued by a building and loan association, homestead asso-
ciation, savings and loan association, or similar institution, substantially all the
business of which is confined to the making of loans to members ....
30. 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c) (1964).
1967]
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Similarly, in 1964, in amending the 1934 Act by providing for the regis-
tration of equity securities by certain issuers, Congress exempted "any
security ...issued by a savings and loan association" from the new
registration provisions."' It should be noted that this exemption in no way
affects the applicability of section 10b of the Act or of rule 10-b5
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to
that section.3 2
The legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts contains very little
comment regarding the applicability of these proposals to savings and
loan associations. Lobbyists for the industry vigorously sought exemp-
tion from the registration provisions of the 1933 Act. On the other hand,
Morton Bodfish, spokesman for these representatives, supported the
application of the anti-fraud provisions of the statute to the issuance of
savings and loan shares, which he described as securities.3"
There was very little discussion of the definition of securities when
the 1934 Act was under consideration by Congress. 4 However, in hear-
ings on the 1964 amendments to the Act the then Chairman of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, William J. Cory, observed in comment-
ing on the exemption provisions:
Because of the fact that most savings and loan associations issue
so-called shares, which in fact merely evidence the existence of
a savings account, special provisions had to be made to exempt
that type of "share."33
The above-described provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 do not establish clearly that a share
account is or is not security. But the provisions should be liberally con-
strued in the light of their purpose to protect investors.36 The exemption
of securities issued by savings and loan associations from the registration
provisions of both acts certainly indicates that Congress understood
such interests to be within the term "security" as defined by the acts. It
also illustrates that when Congress desired to exclude savings and loan
share accounts they knew how to do so in a specific manner without
relying on vague implications.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2) (C) (1964).
32. Both section 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964), and rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1949), are by their terms applicable to "any security."
33. Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 72-74 (1933). See also Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 50-54 (1933); RICHARDS, THE FED-
ERAL SEcuRixxEs ACT, BUILDING AND LOAN ANNALS (1933) at 111, 115-118.
34. See note 26 supra.
35. Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793 and S. 1642 Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1213 (1963).
36. SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); SEC v. W. J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
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The majority opinion attributed these exemptions to an overabun-
dance of caution on the part of Congress, and found the exemption of
ordinary insurance policies to be analogous.37 The court reasoned that
despite the negative implication created by exemption there is general
agreement that insurance policies are not securities.38 They then applied
this same reasoning to share accounts and arrived at a similar conclu-
sion. 9 In reaching this conclusion the majority ignored some elements
which might distinguish share accounts from ordinary insurance policies.
In the first place, unlike share accounts, insurance policies possess
none of the attributes of a security. 0 Secondly, the legislative history of
the 1933 Act clearly indicates that Congress did not intend for such inter-
ests to be covered by the legislation." Thirdly, by concentrating on insur-
ance policies the court failed to consider several types of securities which
are exempted from the registration but which are, nevertheless, subject
to the anti-fraud provisions. 2
Finally, it should be noted that since the Tcherepnin decision the
Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co.43 has
placed some limitations on the exemption of insurance devices from the
registration provisions of the 1933 Act, particularly when the appeal to
the purchaser is on the basis of growth and investment as compared to
the prospect of stability and security.
As indicated previously, the definition of a security in the 1933 Act
was adopted by Congress in the 1934 Act with one minor exception. In
the majority decision the court seized upon this difference and reasoned
that the term "evidence of indebtedness" was excluded so as to totally
exempt share accounts from the 1934 Act. 4 In this regard the court's
reasoning is at best tenuous. The committee hearings on the 1934 act
contain no indication that this was the intent of Congress. In addition,
the subsequent exemption of securities issued by savings and loan associ-
ations from the registration provisions of the 1964 amendments 4 strongly
indicate that Congress considered share accounts not to have been taken
out of the Act by deletion of the term "evidence of indebtedness."
In his strong dissent, Judge Cummings suggests a rational basis for
the deletion of evidence of indebtedness. Both Acts specifically exempt
short term commercial paper from the definition of security.46 By includ-
37. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (8) (1964).
38. See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 496-97 (2d ed. 1961).
39. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 371 F.2d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 1967).
40. Seetext supra, pp. 397.
41. 1 L. Loss, supra note 38.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1964).
43. 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
44. 371 F.2d at 377-78.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2) (C) (1964).
46. 15 U.S.C. 77c(a) (3) (1964) ; 15 U.S.C. 78c(a) (10) (1964).
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ing evidence of indebtedness and excluding short term commercial paper
the acts were contradictory and inconsistent. To remedy this, evidence
of indebtedness was deleted. 47
IV. THE CATCHALLS-THE INVESTMENT CONTRACT AND CERTIFICATE
OF INTEREST OR PARTICIPATION IN ANY PROFIT SHARING AGREEMENT
The breadth of the definition of a "security" in the 1933 and 1934
Acts is amply demonstrated by Professor Loss' illustrations of coverage
in schemes, "many of them of the Alice in Wonderland variety" involving
animals, fishing boats automobile trailers, vending machines, parking
meters, tung trees, and coin collections.4" Professor Loss further points
out that the various categories within the definition of the term security
are not mutually exclusive and are meant to be catchalls.49 The majority
in Tcherepnin, after setting out the definition of a security as contained
in the 1934 Act, concluded without comment that "[t]he type of interest
now before us, if it is covered by this definition, must be an instrument
commonly known as a security."' 5 By establishing this premise the court
apparently ignored the fact that this category was not intended to be a
limitation upon the preceding categories,"' and it avoided the two most
litigious categories of the security definition, the "investment contract"
and a "certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing agree-
ment." 2
A. The Howey & Joiner Decisions
Probably the two most celebrated cases in the field of securities
regulation are the decisions of SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp 3 and
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.54 Both cases dealt with the definition of a secu-
rity, and both dealt with novel and uncommon devices. Taken together
the Joiner and Howey decisions establish a workable definition which has
served as a polestar for the lower courts. The test "embodies a flexible
rather than a static principle" in order to cope with the "variable schemes
devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise
of profits."5"
In the Joiner case the defendants engaged in a campaign to sell
assignments of oil leases. The contract included, however, more than
47. 371 F.2d at 380, n.3.
48. 1 L. Loss, supra note 38, at 490-91.
49. Id. at 488-89.
50. 371 F.2d at 376.
51. Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953) cert. denied, 346 U.S. 923
(1954).
52. For an excellent discussion of various devices treated as securities within these
categories see, H. SOWARDS, THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT 2-17 & 2-35 (1965).
53. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
54. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
55. Id. at 299.
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naked leasehold rights, it also represented to the buyer that the Joiner
Company was engaged in and would complete the drilling of a test
well so located as to test the oil producing possibilities of the offered
leaseholds.56 The advertising literature emphasized the character of the
interest as an investment and as a "participation in an enterprise. ' 7
In categorizing this scheme as an investment contract and a "secu-
rity" within the definition of the Securities Act of 1933, the court rejected
a strict construction of the Act58 and stated:
[t]he reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and com-
monplace. Novel, uncommon or irregular devices, whatever
they appear to be, are also reached if it be proved as a matter
of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under terms or
courses of dealing which established their character in com-
merce as "investment contracts"...
In applying acts of this general purpose, the courts have not
been guided by the nature of the assets lack of a particular
document or offering. The test rather is the character the in-
strument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the
plan or distribution, and the economic inducements held out to
the prospect .... 59
In the Joiner decision the Supreme Court set down certain rules of
construction to be applied to the securities acts and established a method
of analyzing devices to determine whether they are included within the
purview of the acts. A strict or technical construction was rejected in
favor of a liberal view in conformity with the acts' general remedial pur-
pose.6" As for the definition of a "security," "form was disregarded for
substance and emphasis was placed upon economic reality."6' 1
Some three years after the Joiner decision, the Supreme Court elab-
orated on the concept of the investment contract in the landmark case
of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. 2
In Howey, the defendants offered for sale acreage planted in citrus.
56. The simple genius of Joiner's scheme, although not pertinent to the inquiry herein,
is nonetheless worthy of note. The original consideration for leases on 4,700 acres was the
agreement to drill. Joiner assumed this agreement and received leases on 3,002 acres. By
using his agreement to drill as an incentive, he was able to sell leases on between 1,000 and
2,000 acres at from $.00 to $15.00 per acre. Had the scheme not been thwarted, Joiner could
have fulfilled his obligation to drill the well, recouped his expenses, and would still have
had over one thousand acres left for the gamble, with no investment of his own.
57. The exploration enterprise was woven into these leaseholds in both an economic
and legal sense; the undertaking to drill a well runs through the whole transaction
as the thread on which everybody's beads were strung.
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 348 (1943).
58. Id. at 350.
59. Id. at 351-53
60. Id. at 350.
61. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
62. Id.
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The land was conveyed by warranty deed. At the time of the purchase the
investor was informed that the purchase of the land was not feasible
unless he also made service arrangements. Service arrangements were
made in eighty-five percent of the purchases with Howey in the Hills
Service, Inc. Both W. J. Howey Co. and Howey in the Hills Service, Inc.,
were Florida corporations under direct common control and manage-
ment.
The service contracts were for ten-year periods without option of
cancellation, and granted to the service corporation a leasehold interest
in the land with "full and complete possession." For a specified fee the
service corporation was given complete authority and discretion over the
cultivating, harvest, and marketing of the crops. The investor had no
right of entry to market the crops without the consent of the company
and there was no right to specific fruit. The company was accountable
only for an allocation of the net profits.
In holding that the land sales contract, the warranty deed, and the
service contract taken together constituted a sales contract, the court
stated:
[A]n investment contract for the purposes of the Securities
Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party ....
If that test be satisfied, it is immaterial whether the enterprise
is speculative or non-speculative or whether there is a sale of
property with or without intrinsic value."
The economic realities of a share account in a savings and loan asso-
ciation dictate that such an interest falls within the definition of an in-
vestment contract under the Howey-Joiner test. The investors or share-
holders provide the capital for a "common enterprise" (the association)
and are "led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party" (the management). So closely analogous are the two situa-
tions that the following quotation from Justice Murphy's majority opinion
in Howey could have been made in reference to the relationship between
a share account holder and the savings and loan association:
Thus all the elements of a profit seeking venture are present
here. The investors provide the capital and share in the earnings
and profits; the promoters manage, control and operate the
enterprise. It follows that the arrangements whereby the in-
vestors interests are made manifest involve investment con-
tracts regardless of the legal terminology in which such con-
tracts are clothed. 4
63. Id. at 298-99, 301.
§j. Id, .4t 399,
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The Howey-Joiner test has been applied by the courts to a variety
of interests,6 5 the majority of these decisions, however, offer very little
in the way of analysis which would be of assistance in the instant case.
B. Sale of Mortgages and Deeds of Trust
One area of application of the Howey-Joiner test worthy of note in-
volves offerings of whole or fractional interests in mortgages or deeds of
trust under arrangements which provide for a variety of services to the
investor. In response to an increased number of offerings of such devices
the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a release in 1958 with
particular reference to the status of such interests as securities.6 In this
release the Commission indicated the more common services or attributes
offered in connection with these interests which in the words of the Com-
mission "may give rise to the creation of 'investment contracts' within
the meaning of the securities laws."67 The services indicated by the com-
mission are as follows:
(a) Complete investigation and placing service.
(b) Servicing collection, payments, foreclosures, etc.
(c) Implied or express guarantee against loss at time or provid-
ing a market for the underlying security.
(d) Making advances of funds to protect the security of the
investment
(e) Acceptance of small uniform or continuous investments
(f) Implied or actual guarantee of specified yield or return.
(g) Continual reinvestment of funds.
(h) Payment of interest prior to actual purchase of the mort-
gage or trust note.
(i) Providing for fractional interests in mortgages or deeds of
trust.
(j) Circumstances which necessitate complete reliance upon the
seller, e.g., great distance between mortgaged property and
investor.
(k) Seller's selection of the mortgage or deed of trust for the
investor. 8
Some two years after the Commission's release, the question of
whether these devices were securities was litigated in the case of Los
Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC.69 The defendants in
that case were selling through their "secured 10% earnings program,"
second trust deeds or mortgages. Included with these interests defendants
also provided an extensive program of services. The majority of the pur-
chasers never saw the deed of trust they purchased, no physical delivery
65. H. SowARDs, supra note 52.
66. SEC SECURITIES AcT RFLEASE No. 3892 (1958).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960) cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1960)
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was made, and title was recorded in the name of the defendant.7" Pur-
chasers were encouraged to rely on the skill and knowledge of defendant's
officers who allegedly checked the worth of the trust deeds. Defendants
also serviced and made collections on the notes purchased and handled
foreclosure when necessary.7 Customers paid into "accounts" and ac-
counts opened and additions received by the 20th of the month earned
from the 1st. In addition, defendant maintained a type of account insur-
ance in the form of a bond and reserve to prevent the purchaser from
suffering a loss in the event of a default of particular trust deed. Noting
that Howey added the test of common enterprise to the Joiner test of
results dependant on the efforts of one other than the purchaser, the court
stated:
The terms of the offer, the peon of distribution, the economic
inducements held out to the prospects, the results dependent
on one other than the purchaser, the common enterprise, all com-
bine herein to make the second trust deed notes "securities" as
that term has been defined by the Supreme Court.72
Although varying somewhat in form, the interests offered in the Los
Angeles Trust Deed case are strikingly similar to a share account. Funds
from investors supplied the capital which was invested in secured loans
on real property, while the promoter or management serviced the ac-
counts by selection of investments, collection, allocation of earnings and
foreclosure. Investors were provided with insurance to protect their in-
vestment, and funds in by the 20th of the month earn from the 1st.73 In
addition, the common services associated with the offering of whole or
fractional interests in mortgages and trust deeds, indicated by the Com-
mission's release as indicia of an investment contract, are basically those
services provided to the holder of a share account by the management
of a savings and loan association.
Admittedly, the two interests or devices differ structurally in that the
trust deed and mortgage schemes involve the purchase of a particular
70. Id. at 168.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 172. The advertising brochure of defendants had the following provisions con-
cerning foreclosure:
(k) [Foreclosure] is a simple procedure, and of course, we would handle the details
without additional cost.
(1) We notify you of such default and give you an opportunity to foreclose the
property yourself and make the extra profit if you so desire ....
Id. at 168, n.3.
By allowing the purchaser to participate in this manner it would seem that his profits
would be less dependent on the efforts of others. Of course, share account holders in savings
and loan associations do not have a right to perform these management functions. As a
result, it would seem that the Howey-Joiner element of profits dependent upon others
would be even more applicable to share accounts.
73. Id. at 174.
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deed, where savings and loan associations make their loans from com-
mingled savings. However, this practice would seem to even better satisfy
the "common enterprise" factor in the Howey test.
V. METHOD OF SALE-HEREIN THE "DOORSTEP" RULE
The majority opinion in Tcherepnin placed emphasis on the pre-
amble of the Securities Exchange Act, 74 which in providing a brief ex-
planation of the "necessity for regulation" refers to the sale of securities
as conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets.7 5
Reasoning that the Act was passed in the aftermath of the economic dis-
aster of 1929, the court apparently considered its scope to extend only to
securities traded over exchanges or upon organized over-the-counter mar-
kets. Since a share account is, of course, not traded or sold in this manner
the court reasoned that it did not come within the scope of section 10b
of the Act.
Upon reading the preamble to the 1934 Act, the court's argument
appears at first blush to be plausible. However, closer scrutiny of section
10b 76 under which plaintiffs sought relief, and of rule 10b-577 promul-
gated by the S.E.C. in response to the congressional authorization con-
tained in section 10b, indicates that the scope of these provisions may
not be so limited.
Section 10b provides that it shall be unlawful to use any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance by use of means of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities ex-
change, "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered.7 8
Rule 10b-5 is not limited to exchange or organized over-the-counter trad-
ing but is applicable to the "purchase or sale of any security. 7'9 Thus, al-
though the general statements contained in the act's preamble allude to
problems existing in exchange and organized over-the-counter markets,
the specific provisions of the act clearly manifest a congressional intent
to regulate, with specific exclusions, all trading in securities no matter
how the transaction may be conducted.
The legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act clearly indi-
cates that Congress, by enunciating certain policy considerations involv-
ing securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets as a basis for the
remedial legislation, did not intend thereby to limit the scope of the
act's application to exchange and organized over-the-counter market
74. 371 F.2d at 376-77 (9th Cir. 1967).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964) (emphasis added).
79. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949) (emphasis added).
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transactions. This is most succinctly evidenced by the following defini-
tion of the term over-the-counter market contained in the hearings on
1938 amendments to the Securities and Exchange Act:
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the over-the-counter
markets are deemed to be all transactions in securities which
take place otherwise than upon a national securities exchange.80
In addition to the provisions of the act, there is a substantial body
of case law that has consistently refused to limit the scope of sec-
tion 10b and rule 10b-5 in the manner suggested by the majority in
Tcherepnin.8'
In Speed v. Transamerica Corp."2 the issue was squarely presented
by the defendants who argued that the preamble to the act limited the
scope of its provisions to "public" sales. In rejecting this contention, the
court defined "over-the-counter" in a manner consistent with recovery:
An over-the-counter transaction is simply one which does not
utilize the facilities of a securities exchange, but under the un-
ambiguous provisions of the Act it covers the sale or purchase
of a security on a doorstep as well as the trading of a profes-
sional securities broker.83
Other courts have consistently recognized this broad interpretation
of the term over-the-counter, either expressly 84 or impliedly by permitting
an action to be maintained when the transaction was face to face. 5
Utilizing these criteria set down both by Congress and by judicial
decisions, the relevant inquiry is not how or where the sale of the partic-
ular item was consummated, but rather whether or not the item was a
security. If the item is held to be a security then the provisions of the
act are applicable whether the transaction takes place through the facili-
ties of a securities exchange or is sold in any other manner.
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Savings and loan associations have experienced a phenomenal rate
of growth. Beginning in the war and post war period and continuing
to the present the percentage of total savings invested by consumers
80. S. REP. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938) ; H.R. REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess., 2 (1938). See also 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1277-78 (2d ed. 1961).
81. For a complete discussion of these decisions see: Klein, The Extension of a Private
Remedy to Defrauded Securities Investors Under SEC Rule 1OB-5, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 81
(1965).
82. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
83. Id. at 830.
84. Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960); Hooper v. Mountain States
Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953);
Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ill. 1952).
85. Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1953); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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and non-profit organizations in savings and loan associations has risen
from 7.5% in 1945 to 28.6% in 1960.86 Competition for the individual's
investment within the savings and loan industry itself, and between sav-
ings and loan associations and other forms of investment is widespread
and remarkably keen.8 7 The consumer is faced with a barrage of induce-
ments varying from free gifts to interest on funds from the 1st of the
month if invested by the 10th. Highest and higher interest rates are ad-
vertised in addition to the even higher "bonus account" rates. 8 Although
the safety aspect of a share account continues to be emphasized it now
is given only brief mention while "big yields" and "high earnings" are
offered as the primary inducements for what is termed "one of the
soundest and most profitable investments you can find."18 9 In short, the
opportunities "to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading" 9 are great.
Typically, the savings and loan share account holder is a small in-
vestor, at least as unwary and in need of protection as the individual
holder of corporate stock.9 However, there are certain countervailing
factors in the form of current stock market practices which tend to pro-
vide the holder of corporate shares with some protection, at least, in the
form of information not available to a holder of a share account. In
1965, 56.7% of shareholders' initial acquisitions were made with the
guidance of a broker.9 In addition, ever increasing numbers of investors
are turning to mutual funds and other investment companies, where again
they are provided with expert and experienced investment guidance. 9a
It can, of course, be argued that since rates of return on savings and loan
share accounts vary only slightly there is no need for such guidance. But
86. P. HORVITZ, PRIVATE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 286 (1963).
87. Id. at 278-92.
88. Bonus accounts are usually in minimum amounts of $1,000 in $1,000 multiples. Cur-
rent annual interest is paid on these accounts with an additional bonus percentage earned if
held for a specified period of time.
89. The emphasized portions of this sentence have all been taken from advertisements
of savings and loan associations appearing in The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 2, 1967.
90. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949).
91. Very little is available in the way of data upon which a comparison can be based.
However, the relative income of the two groups is of some value. INSTITUTION FOR MOTIVA-
TIONAL RESEARCH, THE U.S. SAVINGS & LOAN LEAGUE AND SAVINGS AND LOAN FOUNDATION,
REPORT ON ATTITUDES 31 (1961) indicates that in 1961, 32% of the users of savings and
loan associations had incomes of $5,000 or less. 58% had incomes of between $5,001 and
7,500. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BooK 35 (1967) indicates that shareowner median
household income for the year 1962 was $8,600, and $9,500 in 1965.
92. The Stock Ownership Outlook, 58 BANKING 33 (Part I 1965).
93. It has been estimated that by the end of 1966, 28.1% of the listed stocks on the
New York Stock Exchange were held by open and closed end investment companies. NEW
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE'S FACT BooKc (1967) ; in addition, the exchange makes periodic de-
tailed checks of the transactions on its floor, in an effort to identify the kinds of investors
behind them. Such a check made on September 13, 1961, indicated that a bare majority of
the transactions (51%) involved individuals. FORTUNE, June 1963, at 208.
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this argument ignores the fact that rate of return is only one factor of
many that the prudent investor should consider.
Tcherepnin illustrates the pitfalls which may face the uninformed
investor. At the time the plaintiffs were induced to invest in share ac-
counts the City Savings Association was on the brink of insolvency and
on a limited withdrawal basis. The association had been unable to obtain
federal insurance for its shareholders,9 4 and its one year Morocca insur-
ance had not been renewed. Despite this, City Savings for lack of full
disclosure requirements, was able to advertise its financial strength and
appeal to prospective investors on the basis of prospective profits and
security.
VII. CONCLUSION
A share account in a savings and loan association is, in economic
reality, a classical illustration of the investment contract and a security
within the purview of the Securities Act of 1933"5 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.96 Admittedly, such a holding imposes additional
regulations on an already heavily regulated industry. However, compli-
ance with the rules and regulations of section 10b would not involve an
excessive burden in light of the investor protection afforded.
[Subsequent to the time this comment was written the Supreme Court
in a unanimous decision reversed the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals.9 7 Viewing the lower court's decision as a product of misplaced
emphasis, the Court held that share accounts are securities within defini-
tion of the 1934 Securities & Exchange Act. Although the Court stated
that share accounts most closely resemble investment contracts, they
refused to specifically categorize share accounts within any one of the
descriptive terms relating to the definition of the term security, and
found that the petitioners' shares fit well within several other descriptive
terms contained in the 1934 Act including "certificates of interest or
participation in any profit sharing agreement," "stock" and "transfer-
able shares."]
94. Although all federal savings and loan associations are required to insure their share-
holders' accounts under Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Act, state chartered
associations are under no such obligation. 12 U.S.C. § 1726 (1966).
95. 15 U.S.C. 77a (1964).
96. 15 U.S.C. 78a (1964).
97. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 36 U.S.L.W. 4088 (U.S. Dec. 18, 1967).
